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时间：2024年05月08日 15:30-17:10

线下地点：北师大珠海校区励教楼E106会议室

线上腾讯会议ID：376-244-561

主题：A critical analysis of the debt trap and other narratives

surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative

主讲人：北京师范大学一带一路学院Pompeo Della Posta教授

主办单位：北京师范大学一带一路学院

会议语言：英语

主讲人简介：

Pompeo Della Posta，意大利欧洲大学学院经济学博士，英国华威大学经济学硕士，意大利锡耶纳大学经济学学士。曾为斯坦福大学访问学者，普林斯顿大学访问学者。曾任意大利比萨大学副教授，国际贸易与金融协会2019年候任主席。现任北京师范大学一带一路学院教授，国际贸易与金融协会理事会理事，在线跨学科期刊《科学与和平》（Scienza a Pace）主任。主要研究领域包括发展金融学、国际货币经济学、发展经济学等。

内容简介：

The Belt and Road Initiative was launched in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping with the aim of 'maintaining closer economic ties, increasing political trust, encouraging different civilisations to learn from each other and prosper together, and promoting mutual understanding and friendship among the peoples of all countries'. The success of the initiative is demonstrated by the fact that 149 countries (out of 193 UN members) are now associated with it.

Despite all this, however, much criticism has been raised against the BRI, which is accused of being a tool to increase Chinese geopolitical influence over the world. According to its detractors, the BRI practices a form of corrupt capitalism that leads to predatory lending while creating debt traps aimed at seizing the strategic infrastructure assets of debtor countries. The 'debt trap' narrative is accompanied by other narratives, including that of the 'secrecy' of the debts created by the BRI. According to the latter, the real size of the debt is hidden and the conditions attached to it are opaque, thus making it possible to set preferential terms in favour of 'Chinese debt' (as if the Chinese government, rather than a wide range of Chinese private and public institutions, were the only creditor) and violating the terms of the 'Paris Club' agreement.

Against these claims, it should first be noted that the main motivation of the BRI was to provide a development opportunity for China's western regions, which are historically less developed than the coastal ones, rather than to pursue Chinese geopolitical ambitions. In order to do so, it is necessary to foster the communication infrastructure and development of neighbouring regions, primarily those in Central Asia and South-East Asia: it is no coincidence that the project was announced at two different times and regions, first in Astana (Kazakhstan, Central Asia), then in Jakarta (Indonesia, South-East Asia). Moreover, the least developed and developing countries suffer from a large infrastructure gap, as documented by the regional development banks of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The BRI should be welcomed for its effort in reducing this gap.

It should also be emphasised that the success of investments undertaken within the framework of the BRI is in the primary interest of China, as of any other institution making an investment. An abundance of literature, reviewed in this article, convincingly refutes the debt trap and secrecy narrative and demonstrates the bias of the examples of asset seizures that have been put forward to criticise the BRI.

This is not to deny that some physiological problems were encountered in the first years of BRI implementation. This is true for any initiative. The reduction in the pace of investment flows (signalling a more cautious approach to lending) and the focus on smaller-scale (and green) projects, among other things, suggest that efforts are being made to avoid running into these problems again in the future.